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I.   INTRODUCTION 
There is no doubt that monetary policy is largely endogenous, since it is the major means of 
fine-tuning the economy to reduce costly economic fluctuations driven by shocks. Given that it 
takes time for the impact of shocks to be manifested in macroeconomic aggregates such as 
output and inflation, the theoretical monetary literature suggests that optimal monetary policy 
should react directly to the causes of the fluctuations (that is, the shocks) rather than indirectly to 
the consequences of the fluctuations (that is, the movements in output and inflation).
2 
 A challenge to researchers of monetary theory has always been how best to characterize and 
represent the endogenous aspect of optimal monetary policy. A large literature has suggested that 
good monetary policy can be represented by a simple interest rate policy rule proposed by Taylor 
(1993)—the Taylor rule. Most recent studies represent the Taylor rule as a relationship between 
the policy rate and some key macro variables (for example, the output gap and inflation). 
According to this conventional interpretation, the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) should raise the 
federal funds rate in response to an increase in the output gap and inflation. A big advantage of 
the conventional Taylor rule is that it is a very intuitive and simple way of capturing the 
behavioral relationships between monetary policy and macro variables. 
However, this representation and interpretation of the Taylor rule may not fully reconcile 
with the notion of optimal monetary policy because it not only ignores the fact that optimal 
control is a dynamic feedback and learning process, but also assumes away the policymakers’ 
ability to react to the more fundamental causes behind the output gap and inflation. Policies that 
react only to the consequences rather than to the causes are clearly suboptimal.  
                                                 
2 In the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy using dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium models, 
optimal monetary policy is designed with respect to specific shocks instead of to endogenous variables such as 
output or inflation (for example, Khan, King, and Wolman, 2003; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004; and Benigno and 
Woodford, 2005). Considering the implementability condition, however, a number of studies have focused on a 
policy rule whereby policy variables are set as a function of a small number of easily observable macroeconomic 
indicators (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007).    
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The optimal-monetary-policy view advocates more discretion than the conventional 
interpretation of the Taylor rule.
3 The conventional interpretation of the Taylor rule suggests that 
higher inflation should call for monetary tightening regardless of the sources of shocks. 
However, inflation pressure arises not only from the demand side (owing to, for example, credit 
expansions) but also from the supply side (owing to, for example, oil shocks). The desired policy 
responses to inflation stemming from a credit expansion will differ from those from an oil 
shock—the latter involves relative price changes as opposed to a uniform increase in the real 
interest rate. The same argument applies to the output gap.
4 An important issue that has recently 
emerged is how policymakers should respond to supply-induced inflation stemming from rising 
commodity and food prices. 
This paper characterizes endogenous monetary policy as a reaction function to structural 
shocks, as suggested by the optimal monetary policy literature. We estimate the reaction function 
of the Fed using structural VARs (SVARs) and map the structural response functions into a 
behavioral relationship between the policy rate and the shock-specific output and inflation 
movements. The uncovered behavioral relationship is analogous to the conventional Taylor rule, 
but with respect to decomposed individual structural shocks. We call these structural policy 
functions new Taylor rules. Along the lines of many studies that emphasize an important shift in 
monetary policy associated with Fed chairmanship, we estimate the new Taylor rules for two 
sub-samples: the pre-Volcker or pre-1979 (1960:Q1–79:Q2) period, encompassing the era of 
Martin, Burns, and Miller as Federal Reserve chairmen, and the post-1979 period (1979:Q3–
09:Q1), including the terms of Volcker and Greenspan.  
                                                 
3 The more traditional monetary policy literature suggests that, in response to a positive demand shock, optimal 
policy is characterized as monetary tightening (Poole, 1970); and conversely in response to a positive productivity 
shock, monetary easing for output stability counteracts monetary tightening for price stability (Dotsey and King, 
1983; and Canzoneri and others, 1983). More recently, Dotsey and Hornstein (2002) show that optimal interest rate 
policy requires lower interest rates in response to output increases driven by productivity shocks. 
4 The conventional interpretation of the Taylor rule suggests that a higher output gap should call for monetary 
tightening. However, the optimal monetary policy literature would not necessarily recommend an equal amount of 
monetary contraction if the increased output gap is caused by an adverse supply shock to the trend component of 
output (for example, a natural disaster) rather than by a positive demand shock to the cyclical component of output.    
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The new Taylor rules reveal richer information about the monetary policy stance than the 
conventional Taylor rule. First, the new Taylor rules show significant differences between the 
pre- and post-1979 periods. Consistent with earlier studies (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998; Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler, 1999, 2000; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004; Primiceri, 2005, 2006; and Boivin 
and Giannoni, 2006),
5 monetary policy in the post-1979 period appears to have put more 
emphasis on fighting inflation than earlier. However, our results also indicate that the pre-1979 
period was not associated with multiple equilibria as suggested, for example, by Clarida and 
others (2000). Second and more important, the degree of discretion and the style of the policy 
reaction functions between the two sub-periods differ starkly. The Fed appears to have become 
better at distinguishing demand and supply shocks and thus using discretion in response to 
different shocks in the post-1979 period than the pre-1979 period. In particular, the pre-1979 
policy entailed an excessive initial response of interest rates to inflation and output growth, 
followed by a sharp decline in policy responses over longer horizons. This style of policy is the 
reminiscent of a “bang-bang” control. In contrast, the post-1979 policy entailed gradual interest 
rate responses to inflation and output growth over a time period of 10 quarters or longer. This 
style of policy reflects optimal control with a precautionary learning mechanism.
6 
This paper also uses counter-factual experiments to quantify the dynamic effect of 
endogenous monetary policy on inflation and output and the contribution of such a policy to 
stabilizing the economy. The traditional empirical literature on monetary policy effects identifies 
monetary policy changes as unanticipated shocks to the economy and conduct impulse response 
analysis and variance decomposition accordingly. The policy shocks identified in this way 
capture only the exogenous component of monetary policy. Hence this approach provides limited 
                                                 
5 Many studies have stressed that monetary policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s were not as successful as those of 
the last two decades—the “policy mistakes” view. This view is compared with the “bad luck” view (the volatility of 
exogenous, non-policy shocks was higher) and the “lack of commitment” view (policymakers did not have 
incentives to keep inflation low) in explaining the high inflation in the 1960s and 1970s.   
6 There is a strand of the literature that focuses on policymakers’ learning dynamics. For example, Primiceri (2006) 
suggests that the “Great Inflation” in the 1960s and 1970s was attributable to policymakers’ bias on both the natural 
rate of unemployment and the persistence of inflation in the Phillips curve.      
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insight as to whether monetary policy is effective in reducing economic volatility.
7 In contrast, 
we focus on the part of monetary policy that responds systematically to economic shocks. This 
endogenous aspect of monetary policy has not been fully investigated by the VAR literature. 
Notable exceptions are Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997, 2004). This paper builds on 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson’s work and takes a step further in this direction.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides an econometric framework to develop 
new Taylor rules from an SVAR model. Section III describes the empirical results of the SVAR 
(with impulse responses, historical decompositions of variables, and spectral decompositions of 
volatility) and reports the estimated new Taylor rules, along with the conventional rules for 
comparison purposes. Section IV uses counterfactual simulations to evaluate the effects of 
contemporaneous endogenous policy. Section V concludes the paper. 
   
II.   ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK FOR NEW TAYLOR RULES 
A. Identification 
 
We consider a three-variable SVAR model to account for policy reactions to demand and 
supply shocks under a minimal structure. The variables included in the SVAR are output growth 
( y  ), the rate of inflation ( ), and the nominal federal funds rate (i).
8 In line with the existing 
literature, we assume that the Fed has complete control of the funds rate as the policy rate. Hence 
movements in the funds rate reflect the intention of the monetary authority.
9 All variables in the 
SVAR are assumed to be covariance stationary.
10  
                                                 
7 The exogenous aspect of monetary policy is not the focus of our paper since it has been widely studied in the 
literature (for example, Sims, 1982; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Galí, 1992; Leeper, Sims, and Zha, 1996; 
and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000). 
8 We use output growth instead of a measure of the output gap because we want to identify a permanent component 
in the output level from the SVAR analysis. This permanent component represents a stochastic long-run growth 
trend and can be viewed as the potential output. 
9 This by no means suggests that market forces do not play a role in moving the funds rate. However, the Fed has the 
absolute power to change the funds rate if it wants to intervene.  
10 For a robustness check, we find qualitatively the same results from an alternative model where inflation and the 
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where    ,,' yi   x , and  [,,] ' ds    ε  is a vector of serially uncorrelated orthogonal 
disturbances to aggregate demand, aggregate supply and monetary policy, respectively. The  
Wold moving average representation of    ,,' yi   x  is given by 
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where  0 CI  ,  () CL is assumed to be invertible, and v has the covariance matrix ' E   vv . The 
following relationships hold between the two representations (1) and (2): 
 
     0 A  v ε  and  0 jj A CA   for all j.              (3) 
 
where 0 A  is invertible. To uncover the structural representation (1) from the data, we need to 
estimate (2) and use relationship (3) to uncover matrix 0 A . By normalizing the variance of the 
structural shocks to unity, I  '  , we have 00 ' AA  . Since is symmetric, three additional 
restrictions on the elements of 0 A  are required to exactly identify 0 A  and the three structural 
shocks,  v A
1
0
   .  
The following identifying restrictions are imposed to identify the three structural shocks (i.e., 
an aggregate supply shock, an aggregate demand shock and a monetary policy shock): 
 
  R1: Demand shocks have no long-run effects on the level of output. Specifically, the 
(1,1) element in the long-run matrix, 
0 j j A

  , is zero. 
  R2: Monetary policy shocks have no long-run effects on the level of output. 
Specifically, the (1,3) element in the long-run matrix, 
0 j j A

  , is zero. 
  R3: Monetary policy shocks have no contemporaneous effects on output growth. 




R1 and R2 imply that only supply shocks can have long-run effects on the level of output, 
consistent with a standard neoclassical growth model. R3 implies that a monetary policy shock 
can affect GDP only with a lag, a standard assumption in the VAR literature.  
 
B. Uncovering New Taylor Rules 
 
Structural representation (1) implies the following average reaction functions (impulse 
response) for the policy rate and economic fundamentals at arbitrary horizon of  0 N   periods: 
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Using equation (4b) to express demand and supply shocks as functions of [  , y  ] by inversion 
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Equation (5) is our new Taylor rule in its structural-behavioral form. This rule is analogous to the 
conventional Taylor rule adopted in the literature but is richer in structural information regarding 
the endogenous responses of the policy rate to structural shocks over time.  
The new Taylor rule reveals information about the time profile of the policy reaction function 
to inflation and output growth over an arbitrary horizon j=N, after the economy is hit by 
exogenous shocks. It thus characterizes the behavioral style of the Fed. For example, a cautious 
policymaker would react to inflation and output growth in a piece-meal fashion by raising the 
interest rate gradually. In this case, the average reaction functions   /, / NN ii y      increase 
gradually over time. In contrast, an aggressive policymaker would react in a different manner by    
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raising the interest rate sharply in the initial period. In this case,   /, / NN ii y      increase 
sharply in the impact period and decrease sharply in subsequent periods. The new Taylor rules 
thus enable us to investigate how the policymaker responds to inflation and output growth both 
in the short run and in the long run. For example, we can uncover the contemporaneous response 
of the policymaker to inflation and output growth in the impact period by setting  0 N  : 
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We can also uncover the long-run policy response to inflation and output growth by setting 
N :  
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In addition, we can decompose the policy reaction functions into partial responses to 
demand- and supply-induced movements in economic fundamentals. Define 
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where the first component captures policy responses to demand-induced inflation and output 
growth, and the second component captures policy responses to supply-induced ones. We call 
the first component the demand-side Taylor rule and the second component the supply-side    
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Taylor rule. These shock-specific rules can also be expressed in their long- and short-run forms 
by setting  0 N   and  N  respectively, as in equations (6) and (7). 
In the existing literature, a measure of the output gap instead of output growth is typically 
used in the Taylor rule. In our framework, we can also uncover the Taylor rule coefficients with 
respect to a measure of the output gap. Define the output gap as  , ˆ
* y y y    where y is the log of 
actual output and 
* y is the log of potential output determined by long-run technology growth. 
Given that permanent changes in GDP can be interpreted as a long-run stochastic growth trend 
driven by permanent technology shocks (see Blanchard and Quah 1988), supply-induced 
movements in output growth can be the measure of 
* y   and demand-induced movements in 
output growth can be the measure of  y ˆ  . Integrating  y ˆ   over time gives the desired measure of 
the output gap. The Taylor rule coefficients with respect to this measure of the output gap can be 
uncovered from the estimated impulse response functions of  y ˆ  .
11  
 
III.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
A. Data 
 
We use quarterly U.S. time series data over the period 1959:Q1–2009:Q1.
12 The quarterly 
rates of output growth and inflation in period t are measured by  log( ) tt y Y    and 
log( ) tt P   , respectively, where  t Y  is real GDP and  t P  is the GDP deflator (alternatively, the 
CPI). The policy rate ( t i ) is measured by the federal funds rate.  
Figure 1 displays the annualized quarterly interest rates, output growth, and inflation, along 
with NBER business cycle peaks and troughs. The (nominal) interest rate tended to move closely 
with inflation during much of the 1960s and 1970s when inflation was high and persistent,  
                                                 
11 Another definition of the output gap characterizes potential output as a deterministic linear trend, 
* yt   , where   
is the mean growth rate of the economy. It is also straightforward in this case to uncover the Taylor rule coefficients 
with respect to the output gap from our estimated impulse response functions. 
12 We used the following data series, obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED): 
GDP (nominal GDP), GDPC1 (real GDP), FEDFUNDS (effective federal funds rate, %), and CPIAUCSL 
(consumer price index: all items).    
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Figure 1. Output Growth, Inflation, and Interest Rate 
 
Notes: All rates for 1959:Q1–2009:Q1 are quarterly data in annualized percentage. Output growth and inflation, 
respectively, are measured by 400 times the log difference of real GDP and the price index (the GDP deflator or 
CPI). The interest rate is the federal funds rate (annual percentage). Vertical lines denote NBER business cycle 
peaks and troughs.  
  
 
but this association was much weaker or nonexistent in other periods when inflation was 
relatively low and transitory (Choi, 2002). The interest rate rose in 1994–95 owing to the Fed’s 
preemptive tightening but remained steady during 1996–98 despite higher output growth (Sinai, 
2004). The interest rate declined after the 2001 recession and remained low before rising in 
2005. During the financial turmoil of 2007–09, the interest rate fell to historically low levels, 
close to zero by end-2008. Inflation was high and persistent during the 1970s, especially 
attributable to oil shocks. Volcker’s anti-inflation policy kept inflation in check in 1982 and, 
thereafter, policy has consistently aimed at keeping inflation low. Around the 1973, 1979, and 
2007 oil shocks, CPI inflation was followed by GDP deflator inflation, since CPI was more 
susceptible to oil price changes than the GDP deflator.  
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B. IMPULSE RESPONSES AND HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITIONS 
We compute responses of the variables to one-unit structural shocks in SVARs for the pre- 
and post-1979 periods. We also report one-standard-error bands of responses based on 10,000 
replications of bootstrapping. The estimated impulse responses are largely consistent with model 
restrictions and intuitive expectations implied by economic theory. 
We depict the estimated impulse responses of the SVAR in Figure 2. Key differences 
between the sub-periods are threefold. First, the pattern of output and inflation responses to a 
demand shock differs across the two periods: a hump-shaped response is found for inflation in 
the pre-1979 period and for output growth in the post-1979 period. Second, a policy shock has a 
larger and more persistent impact on interest rates in the post-1979 period (when the conduct of 
monetary policy involved changes in the policy rate), compared to the earlier period (when 
monetary aggregates were the focus of monetary policy). Third, inflation falls persistently upon 
the policy shock for the post-1979 period but does not fall first three quarters in the pre-1979 
period, consistent with Boivin and Giannoni (2006). Positive responses of inflation to the 
positive policy rate shock—much less persistent than the case of “price puzzles” of 3 or 4 
years—can be explained as follows. Barth and Ramey (2001) suggest that prices could rise 
following tighter policy if monetary policy operates not only through demand effects but also 
through supply or cost effects.
13 Higher interest rates and financing costs following tighter policy 
lead to higher marginal production costs—a “cost-channel effect.” Also, reduced demand for real 
balances with higher interest rates may require an immediate jump in inflation for money market 
clearing when money supply is exogenous (Barro, 1997, chapter 5)—a “real-balance-channel 
effect.” In the pre-1979 period, the cost-channel and real-balance-channel effects appear to 
outweigh demand effects. Conversely in the post-79 period, the so-called price puzzle 
disappears. This possibly reflects that negative demand effects of monetary policy on inflation  
 
                                                 
13 Giordani (2004) shows that introducing the output gap and capacity utilization in VARs reduces the price puzzle 
but does not eliminate it for periods including pre-1979 samples.    
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to Shocks  
 
A. Pre-1979 
           
 
B. Post-1979 
           
Notes: Impulse-response functions are depicted using the GDP deflator as the price index for the post-1979 
period. The lag length k=4 is chosen for the SVAR model. Vertical scales show the log of output level multiplied by 
100, and inflation and interest rates in annualized percentage. Impulse responses (solid lines) are reported with one-
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dominate positive effects through the cost and real-balance channels, the latter channel being 
muted when money supply becomes largely endogenous under interest rate policy. 
We now focus on the SVAR responses for the post-1979 period (panel B), given the above 
comparisons of responses between the sub-periods. First, a positive, one-unit shock to aggregate 
demand (row 1) has a positive hump-shaped impact on output over three years. The demand 
shock is associated with upward pressure on inflation: the inflation response reaches a peak 
immediately. The interest rate response to the demand shock exhibits persistence with a hump 
shape, reaching a peak in the fourth quarter. The peak may be associated with the culmination of 
tighter policy after the initial pressure from increased output and inflation. Second, a positive 
shock to aggregate supply (row 2) leads to a higher output level in the long run and puts 
downward pressure on inflation—in accordance with neoclassical models: it increases GDP by 
0.5 percentage point on impact and by 1.5 percentage points in 8 years. The shock has a 
persistent negative effect on inflation and is accompanied by a persistent decline in the interest 
rate (an accommodative policy), as downward pressure on interest rates from the substantially 
reduced inflation outweighs upward pressure from the increased output. Lastly, a positive policy 
shock (row 3) entails persistence, in accordance with the Fed’s interest rate smoothing (Choi, 
1999; and Clarida and others, 1999, 2000). Output declines with a brief lag and converges rather 
slowly to its original level. The policy rate hike leads to lower inflation over time, perhaps partly 
reflecting a signaling effect of policy rate changes.  
Figure 3 shows how each of structural shocks contributed to historical movements in a key 
variable in the system, along with their distributions. Panel A suggests that cyclical fluctuations 
in output growth are more attributable to supply shocks than to other shocks. Demand shocks 
clearly contributed to the onset of all recessions. Supply shocks contributed to most recessions 
except for the 1982 recession. Policy shocks tended to reduce output growth before the onset of 
recessions, implying the Fed’s policy tightening around the peak of business cycles. 
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Figure 3. Historical Decompositions of Variables by Shocks and Distributions 
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Interest rate Demand Supply Policy
 
Notes: This figure depicts historical decompositions of output growth, inflation, and interest rates by 
contributing structural shocks, expressed in deviations from the historical mean, for the post-79 period. It also shows 
distributions of variables and contributing shocks. The colored bars in panels depict the annualized quarterly growth 
rate in output growth, inflation, and interest rates. The various lines in each panel show the estimated contributions 
of the various shocks (demand shocks in solid red lines; supply shocks in dotted green lines; and policy shocks in 




  Panel B suggests that inflation variability is attributable equally to demand and supply 
shocks. The contribution of supply shocks to inflation has an inverse image to that of demand 
shocks to output growth, consistent with neoclassical theory—a positive supply shock induces 
downward pressure on inflation by increasing output growth from the supply side. Negative 
demand shocks exerted downward pressure on inflation in recessions. Adverse supply shocks 
increased inflationary pressures during the 1980, 1990, and 2008 recessions:
14 in the 2008 
recession, rising energy and material costs induced positive pressure on inflation, while 
predominating downward inflationary pressures arose from negative demand shocks. Policy 
                                                 
14 The contribution of supply shocks to output growth and inflation is substantially lower for the 1980s and 1990s, 
which may be attributable partly to the reduced variance of supply shocks (Favero and Rovelli, 2003; and Cecchetti 
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shocks contributed positively to inflationary swings after the mid-1990s, in contrast with most of 
the earlier periods. In particular, the positive contribution of policy shocks to inflation during 
2003–05 may be partly attributable to “fear of deflation,” which led to monetary easing and asset 
price booms before the financial crisis. The observation that policy shocks were somewhat 
aligned with endogenous monetary policy means that, around the turning point in inflation, the 
Fed reacted more than what would have been expected by a systematic feedback rule.  
  Panel C suggests that interest rate variability is more attributable to demand shocks than to 
supply shocks. Demand shocks drove interest rates whereas supply shocks often affected interest 
rates in opposite directions—but both shocks pulled down interest rates during the 2007–09 
financial crisis. Policy shocks also contributed substantially to interest variability, while 
offsetting demand shocks during the second half of the 1980s and around the mid-1990s.  
 
C. Spectra of Structural Shocks 
 
Using spectral analysis, we assess the contribution of structural shocks identified from the 
SVARs to the volatility of output, inflation, and interest rates in the frequency domain. Table 1 
reports the shock contribution to volatility at different frequency ranges. Shock contributions 
differ between the pre- and post-1979 periods. In particular, inflation volatility at high 
frequencies is attributable more to policy shocks than to other shocks in the pre-1979 period but 
mainly attributable to demand shocks in the later period. Output volatility at high frequencies is 
driven by demand shocks in the pre-1979 period but by supply shocks in the later period. 
For the pre-1979 period (panel A), supply shocks have a dominant contribution to output 
volatility at low frequencies (93 percent), while demand shocks do at the business cycle (63 
percent) and high frequencies (88 percent). Inflation volatility is mostly attributable to policy 
shocks at high frequencies (83 percent) and to supply shocks at other frequencies. Interest rate 
volatility in all frequency ranges is dominated by supply shocks (over 60 percent).     
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A. Pre-1979 Period          
    Demand shock  Output  0.72  0.88  0.63  0.07 
 Inflation  0.16  0.04  0.22  0.18 
 Interest  rate  0.33  0.12  0.34  0.36 
          
    Supply shock  Output  0.23  0.06  0.33  0.93 
 Inflation  0.36  0.12  0.42  0.61 
 Interest  rate  0.65  0.86  0.63  0.63 
          
    Policy shock  Output  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.00 
 Inflation  0.48  0.83  0.36  0.21 
 Interest  rate  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00 
          
B. Post-1979 Period          
    Demand shock  Output  0.41  0.26  0.61  0.20 
 Inflation  0.53  0.53  0.64  0.46 
 Interest  rate  0.64  0.17  0.60  0.75 
          
    Supply shock  Output  0.47  0.51  0.36  0.75 
 Inflation  0.42  0.45  0.32  0.44 
 Interest  rate  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.07 
          
    Policy shock  Output  0.12  0.23  0.03  0.05 
 Inflation  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.10 
 Interest  rate  0.31  0.81  0.38  0.18 
          
 
Notes: The statistics are from the spectral analysis of impulse responses in the SVAR for the 
pre-1979 period (1960:Q2–1979:Q2) and the post-1979 period (1979:Q3–2009:Q1). The sum of 
contribution by all types of shocks to the volatility of a variable equals 1 at a given range of 
frequency: high (2–6 quarters), business cycle (6–32), or low (32–10
5). (See also Figure 6 for 
spectral density functions under the historical scenario.) 
 
 
For the post-1979 period (panel B), supply shocks have a dominant contribution to output 
volatility at high frequencies (51 percent) as well as at low frequencies (75 percent), while 
demand shocks do at the business cycle (over 60 percent). Inflation volatility in all frequency 
ranges is mainly attributable to demand shocks and little to policy shocks. Interest rate volatility 
is driven by policy shocks at high frequencies (81 percent) and by demand shocks at the business 
cycle and low frequencies (60–75 percent), but very little by supply shocks, reflecting smooth 
and substantive policy responses to demand shocks.  
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D. UNCOVERING AND DISSECTING TAYLOR RULES 
We next estimate the new Taylor rules to evaluate the stance of U.S. monetary policy for two 
sub-samples associated with Fed chairmanship: the pre-Volcker or pre-1979 (1960:Q1–79:Q2) 
and post-1979 period (1979:Q3–09:Q1).  
The new Taylor rule in equation (5) can be expressed as: 
() tt y t i t iy L         .  
 
We obtain the new Taylor rule from the estimated SVAR when inflation is measured in the GDP 
deflator (Table 2, panel A). We also report standard errors (in parentheses) of the estimated 
coefficients calculated from 10,000 replications of bootstrapping. The new long-run Taylor rule 




| = 1.93     0.32 , LR iy      
Post-1979:  
(0.68) (0.38)
| = 2.23     0.97 . LR iy     
Monetary policy for both periods was anti-inflationary and ensured equilibrium determinacy 
because the long-run inflation coefficient is larger than one. The small and insignificant 
coefficient of output growth for the pre-1979 period suggests that the Fed was quite lenient with 
respect to output pressure. The new Taylor rule also reveals that the Fed has been more 
aggressive in stabilizing output growth in the post-1979 period. 
The long-run Taylor rules dissected by the source of shocks are estimated as:  
 
Demand-Induced                      Supply-Induced 
Pre-1979:   
(0.62) (0.36)
| = 1.93     0.98 LR iy          
(0.00) (0.13)
| =0.00     0.65 , LR iy    
Post-1979:  
(0.68) (0.56)
| = 2.23     1.40 LR iy          
(0.00) (0.36)
| =0.00     0.43 . LR iy    
 
The results suggest that the Fed is able to differentiate demand shocks from supply shocks and 
takes different policy stances depending on the source of shocks. Monetary policy in both     
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Table 2. Policy Coefficients in New Taylor Rules 
 
 
Period and Rule  Aggregate  Demand Shock  Supply Shock 
   β  βy   β  βy   β  βy 
A. GDP Deflator as the price measure 
  Pre-1979             
            
    Long-run     1.93 (0.62)  0.32 (0.33) 1.93 (0.62) 0.98 (0.36)   0.00 (0.00)  –0.65 (0.13) 
            
    Contemporaneous   12.96 (4.87)  0.61 (0.24) 0.72 (0.40) 0.08 (0.40)  12.24 (4.41)   0.53 (0.22) 
            
  Post-1979          
            
    Long-run    2.23 (0.68)  0.97 (0.38) 2.23 (0.68) 1.40 (0.56)   0.00 (0.00)  –0.43 (0.36) 
            
    Contemporaneous   0.22 (0.20)  0.11 (0.04) 0.23 (0.14) 0.10 (0.06)  –0.02 (0.08)    0.01 (0.04) 
            
B. CPI as the price measure 
  Pre-1979             
            
    Long-run    1.05 (0.32)  0.68 (0.27) 1.05 (0.32) 0.68 (0.27)  0.00 (0.00)  –0.62 (0.16) 
            
    Contemporaneous   1.08 (0.88)  0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.11) 0.04 (0.03)  1.02 (0.80)  –0.03 (0.05) 
            
  Post-1979             
            
    Long-run    1.80 (0.28)  0.72 (0.23) 1.80 (0.28) 1.40 (0.60)  0.00 (0.00)  –0.68 (0.59) 
            
    Contemporaneous   0.25 (0.10)  0.09 (0.04) 0.15 (0.09) 0.15 (0.04)  0.11 (0.10)  –0.06 (0.04) 
            
 
Notes: This table reports the policy coefficients of new Taylor rules for the pre-1979 (1960:Q2–1979:Q2) and 
post-1979 (1979:Q3–2009:Q1) periods, using the GDP deflator (panel A) or CPI (panel B) as the price variable. The 
quarterly rates of interest, output growth, and inflation in period t are measured by the federal funds rate/400, 
log( ) tt yY   , and  log( ) tt P   , respectively, where  t Y  is real GDP and  t P  is the price index. The new Taylor 
rules are constructed by applying equations (6)–(8) to the estimated SVAR model. Figures in brackets are standard 
errors of each parameter estimate obtained from 10,000 replications of bootstrapping.  
 
 
periods was anti-inflationary under demand shocks but non-responsive to inflation under supply 
shocks. Also, the Fed in both periods raised interest rates against faster output growth under 
demand shocks but eased interest rates for faster output growth under supply shocks.  
The short- and longer-run behavior of the new Taylor rule suggests a shift from a bang-bang 
to a gradual control in the dynamic pattern of policy responses, as shown in Table 2. The pre-
1979 policy reflected overreactions to inflation in the short run—the contemporaneous inflation 
coefficient based on the GDP deflator (12.96) is much greater than the long-run coefficient 
(1.93). During this period, the policy response to demand-induced output growth was small and 
insignificant contemporaneously but significantly positive in the long run. During the post-1979 
period, however, the intensity of policy responses was small contemporaneously and gradually    
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Figure 4. Time Profiles of Taylor Rule Coefficients 
 
A. Pre-1979 Period 
 
B. Post-1979 Period 
 
 
Notes: Policy coefficients in the new Taylor rule are uncovered from the SVAR with the GDP deflator for each 
indicated sample period. For all periods, the lag length is chosen at k=4. In each row, policy coefficients on inflation 
(βΔπ), and output growth (βΔy) from all sources (first panel) are decomposed into those from demand shocks (second 
panel) and supply shocks (third panel).  
 
 
rose over time. In both periods, monetary policy was less aggressive toward output fluctuations 
than toward inflation in the short run and the long run. 
Figure 4 complements the above findings by depicting the dynamic transitions of policy 
coefficients in the new Taylor rule using the GDP deflator as the price measure. Aggregate 
policy coefficients (column 1) show a stark difference between the pre- and post-1979 periods. 
The salient feature of the pre-1979 period is the short-run overshooting of the interest rate 
response to inflation, as shown by the dynamics of βπ. This finding suggests that the Fed, in the 
short run, raised the rate sharply with higher inflation, especially stemming from supply shocks, 
and then took corrective changes with its reduced interest rate sensitivity to inflation. In contrast, 
the post-1979 policy entails a gradual transition in dynamic policy reactions. Columns 2 and 3 
depict dynamic policy coefficients decomposed into demand- and supply-induced ones on output     
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growth and inflation using equation (8). Upon demand shocks, the Fed raised the funds rate 
increasingly over time to stabilize output and inflation. Conversely upon supply shocks, except 
for a strong initial response against supply-induced inflation, the Fed tended to accommodate 
pressures on output and inflation over time, as implied by the low or even negative long-run 
values of βπ and βΔy for all sub-periods.  
Our results overall are robust to an alternative price index. As shown in Table 2 panel B, 
when the CPI is used, the estimated Taylor rule coefficients under our structural analysis are 
similar, except that the contemporaneous coefficient of CPI inflation for the pre-1979 period is 
followed by a further sharp increase in βπ with a short lag.   
For comparison purposes, we estimate a conventional dynamic Taylor rule with interest rate 
smoothing, along the lines of Rudebusch (1995, 2002) and Söderlind and others (2005).  
 
     1 (1 )( ) tt y t t t iy i            ,  
 
which is drawn from its original form:   1 (1 )( ) tt y t t t iy i             , where   is an 
“interest rate smoothing” parameter (0 1    ), representing a monotone, geometric response of 
interest rates to inflation and output growth. This specification allows for contemporaneous 
responses of interest rates to inflation and output growth, consistent with the SVAR model 
restrictions. To deal with the endogeneity of regressors, we estimate the rule by the generalized 
method of moments (GMM), using lagged values of inflation, output growth, interest rates, and 
the Livingston survey forecast values of inflation and output growth as instruments.
15  
Table 3 summarizes the estimated conventional Taylor rules. First, all policy coefficient 
estimates are significantly positive. For the pre-1979 period, a relatively smaller weight is placed 
on inflation than output growth, and the long-run inflation coefficient is less than unity, not 
supporting long-run stabilization of inflation. Conversely for the post-1979 period, a relatively 
                                                 
15 Semi-annual forecast data for real GDP growth and CPI inflation from the Livingston Survey are converted into 
quarterly data. Pre-1979 regressions use the industrial production forecast as a proxy for the output forecast 
available only from 1971 (correlation between the two variables is 0.93 for 1971:Q1–2009:Q1).    
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Table 3. Conventional Taylor Rules: GMM Estimation 
 
 
Period and Rule  Parameters  Statistics 
   β  βy  2 R DW J-Test
A. GDP Deflator as the price measure 
  Pre-1979             
            
    Long-run    0.68 (0.12) 1.39 (0.45)
0.73 (0.08) 0.43  1.73  0.05 
    
    Contemporaneous   0.18 (0.06) 0.37 (0.06)
            
  Post-1979           
            
    Long-run    3.01 (0.60) 1.16 (0.39)
0.88 (0.04) 0.28  2.04  0.05 
    
    Contemporaneous   0.36 (0.08) 0.14 (0.03)
            
B. CPI as the price measure 
  Pre-1979             
            
    Long-run    0.65 (0.12) 0.98 (0.41)
0.77 (0.07) 0.43  1.72  0.13 
    
    Contemporaneous   0.15 (0.05) 0.22 (0.06)
            
  Post-1979             
            
    Long-run    2.30 (0.42) 1.96 (0.83)
0.90 (0.03) 0.18  2.12  0.06 
    
    Contemporaneous   0.23 (0.05) 0.19 (0.04)
            
 
Notes: This table summarizes the conventional Taylor rules estimated by GMM for the pre-1979 (1960:Q2–
1979:Q2) and post-1979 (1979:Q3–2009:Q1) periods. The policy rate is the funds rate (annual percentage). Output 
growth and inflation, respectively, are measured by 400 times the log difference of real GDP and the price index. 
Estimates of contemporaneous coefficients are obtained, using the delta method, from the GMM estimators of long-
run coefficients and . Instruments are two lags of inflation and output growth, and current and one-period lagged 
values of expected inflation and output growth, both based on the Livingston survey data. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust errors using the Bartlett kernel and the Andrews 
bandwidth. The J-test statistic is the p-value of Hansen’s test for instrument validity.  
 
higher weight is placed on inflation than on output growth, and the long-run inflation coefficient 
is larger than unity (about 2 or larger). Second, the estimated   is in the range of 0.7–0.9—
implying that policy responses gradually increase over time, irrespective of the source of 
shocks—and indicates stronger interest rate inertia for the post-1979 period than the earlier 
period. Third, for the post-1979 period, relatively low 
2 R  may reflect low variability in interest 
rates. 
2 R is as low as 0.18 with CPI for the post-1979 period, substantially owing to large 
innovations in CPI inflation during the 2008 recession. Fourth, the errors have no serious first-
order serial correlation problem as suggested by Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics, while we find 
correlograms of residuals indicative of some higher-order serial correlations. Lastly, Hansen’s J-
test results weakly support the null hypothesis of instrument validity (with p-values 0.05).    
22 
 
Unlike conventional Taylor rules, the new Taylor rules feature very different, flexible 
dynamics in policy coefficients. For the pre-1979 period, the new Taylor rules entail a short-run 
overreaction of interest rates to (especially supply-induced) inflation, which requires subsequent 
corrective policy reactions, in contrast to the dynamic policy response implied by conventional 
rules. For the post-1979 period, the new Taylor rule better squares with the conventional rule in 
terms of interest rate smoothing as well as contemporaneous and long-run coefficients. For this 
period, since the short-run inflation coefficient is far below unity, an increase in inflation leads to 
a temporary decline in the real interest rate, increasing aggregate demand and raising subsequent 
inflationary pressure. For both periods, however, as implied by the long-run coefficient on 
inflation greater than unity, the increase in inflation calls for higher real interest rates through 
monetary policy over the long run, dampening aggregate demand and stabilizing inflation.
16 
 
IV.   COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENTS   
We conduct counterfactual simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of endogenous monetary 
policy. Counterfactual policy simulations, in general, would be subject to the Lucas (1976) 
critique because model parameters may vary with policy shifts (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; and 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson, 2004). Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson deal with the Lucas 
critique in a VAR analysis by examining transitory, rather than permanent, deviations from the 
observed policy rule. Specifically, they examine the effect of a shock on the economy when the 
endogenous policy response is “shut off”—that is, when the funds rate is held fixed for the initial 
four quarters, after which its behavior is governed by historical policy rule.
17 They find that the 
effects of an oil price shock on output are reduced considerably when the endogenous response 
                                                 
16  Our finding is consistent with Chowdhury and Schabert’s (2008) finding from the “money supply lens” 
approach—which looks at that money supply responses to inflation and the output gap—that the Fed policy was 
sufficiently reactive to inflation so as to ensure equilibrium determinacy during the pre-1979 period.  
17 In contrast, the Sims and Zha (1998) experiment is to shut down “indefinitely” the policy response that would 
otherwise be implied by the VAR estimates. In this case, people are “repeatedly surprised” by the failure of the 
policy response to non-policy shocks, as Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) point out.     
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of the funds rate is shut off, suggesting that the endogenous policy conducted in history 
exacerbated rather than reduced the impact of the shock. 
Our counterfactual analysis is in line with, but less vulnerable to the Lucas critique than that 
of Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson’s approach. We shut off only the contemporaneous response 
of the funds rate to exogenous shocks by setting contemporaneous policy coefficients at zero.
 
Such a one-period change in the policy rule should barely affect the structure of the economy 
since it would take time for people to learn about the change in policy reaction functions.
18 We 
compare impulse responses under the “historical rule” that allows for contemporaneous policy 
with those under the “counterfactual scenario” that imposes no contemporaneous policy.  
Figure 5 depicts responses to demand and supply shocks under different periods. Comparing 
the historical rule with the counterfactual scenario, we find sharp differences in policy impacts 
between the pre- and post-1979 periods (Figure 3). First, for the pre-1979 period (panel A), 
contemporaneous policy has substantial impacts on output and inflation. A contemporaneous 
policy response to output and inflation pressures set off by a positive demand shock results in a 
lower output level,
19 and renders inflation and interest rates higher in the short run and more 
volatile over time, compared to the counterfactual scenario. Upon a supply shock, the historical 
policy rule entails, despite increased output pressure set off by the shock, decreases in the policy 
rate with reduced inflation, boosting output. In contrast, under the counterfactual scenario, no 
contemporaneous policy action results in little changes in output and inflation over time. Second, 
for the post-1979 period (panel B), contemporaneous policy has no substantive impacts owing to 
small contemporaneous policy coefficients in the historical rule. Nonetheless, when the policy 
rate increases contemporaneously in response to output and inflation pressures set off by the 
demand shock, output is somewhat lowered over 2–5 years, compared to the counterfactual case.  
                                                 
18 Leeper and Zha (2003) show that a modest policy change has a small impact on agents’ beliefs about policy 
regime and thus induces no change in the behavior of agents. 
19 In the counterfactual scenario, the demand shock can have a permanent effect on output because imposing zero 
contemporaneous coefficients invalidates restriction R1 when those coefficients are non-zero in the historical rule.    
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Figure 5. Effects of the Contemporaneous Rule: Counterfactual Simulation 
 
A. Pre-1979 Period 
   
 
B. Post-1979 Period 
 
 
Notes: Responses under the historical rule (solid line) and those under the counterfactual scenario (dash-dot 
line) are from the SVAR with the GDP deflator. Vertical scales show the log of output level multiplied by 100, and 
inflation and interest rates in annualized percentage. 
 
Contemporaneous monetary policy has different impacts on economic stability between the 
pre- and post-1979 periods. Figure 6 shows the impacts of counterfactual policy on the variance 
(power spectrum) of output growth, inflation, and interest rates in the frequency domain. The 
peak in inflation volatility shifts from the business cycle to lower frequencies after 1979, 
implying a smoother inflation in the business cycle but a greater swing in the long run, consistent 
with earlier studies (King and Lin, 2005; and Ireland, 2007). This may suggest a trade off 








Shock    
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Figure 6. Impacts of the Contemporaneous Rule on Variance: Spectral Decomposition 
 
A. Pre-1979 Period 
   Output Growth      Inflation              Interest Rates 
 
 
B. Post-1979 Period 
   Output Growth      Inflation              Interest Rates 
 
Notes: The decomposed components of the historical scenario (solid lines) and those of the counterfactual 
scenario (dotted lines) are depicted. The impacts of policy shocks on volatilities, which are the same in the historical 
and the counterfactual scenario, are not depicted. Vertical scales are based on the differenced log levels of output 
and prices and the level of interest rates (annual percentage/400). Cycles per quarter equal to frequency/2, where 
the frequency ranges from 0 to . (The period of the cycle is the inverse of cycles per quarter.)  
 
 
Turning to the details of the graph, for the pre-1979 period (panel A), output volatility at the 
business cycle and low frequencies is attributable substantially to contemporaneous policy 
actions, especially to supply shocks around the peak of quarter 20. Inflation and interest rate 








Shock    
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shocks and, with a greater extent, to supply shocks. For the post-1979 period (panel B), 
volatilities are much less attributable to contemporaneous policy actions than earlier. Notably, 
contemporaneous policy actions result in higher output and inflation volatilities during the pre-
1979 period, whereas they reduce somewhat inflation volatility but affect little output volatility 
during the later period. Hence, the shift in the Fed’s monetary policy from a bang-bang control to 
a gradual one is conducive to macroeconomic stability. This finding is consistent with the view 
that the Fed has conducted systematic monetary policy more effectively since 1980 (Clarida and 
others, 2000; Primiceri, 2005, 2006; and Boivin and Giannoni, 2006). 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines endogenous monetary policy from the structural perspective that 
optimal policy for macroeconomic stability ought to respond directly to the source of shocks 
rather than indirectly to the consequences of shocks for inflation and output. Our analysis brings 
the empirical VAR literature into closer touch with the theoretical literature on optimal monetary 
policy in dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium models, in which monetary policy is optimal 
only with respect to specific shocks. We uncover behavioral relationships between the policy rate 
and macroeconomic variables in the form of Taylor rules based on the identified structural policy 
reaction functions. The uncovered policy rules provide richer structural information about the 
dynamic nature of monetary policy than the conventional Taylor rule, especially about the 
policymakers’ style of responsiveness to movements in inflation and output growth induced by 
structural shocks. Our analysis also enables us to evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy 
via counterfactual studies.  
This paper provides new findings on the style of monetary policy in responding to structural 
shocks. First, the policy rate increases over time more strongly in response to demand-induced 
movements in inflation and output growth than to supply-induced ones, consistent with the 
wisdom from the optimal monetary policy literature. Second, for the pre-1979 period, short-run    
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monetary policy involved aggressive tightening with a bang-bang control, especially upon 
inflation pressure. For the post-1979 period, however, monetary policy was only mildly 
responsive to inflation and output growth in the initial periods, but it became increasingly 
aggressive over time—suggesting a pattern of optimal control with a precautionary or learning 
mechanism. Third, contemporaneous policy actions increased output and inflation volatilities 
substantially during the pre-1979 period, whereas their impact on volatilities was small or even 
negative during the later period.  
Given that the conventional Taylor rule is a distilled representation of an amalgam of 
complex endogenous policy responses, the use of such a rule in adjusting the policy rate to 
output and inflation, irrespective of the source of shocks, is suboptimal. The structural dissection 
of the Taylor rule should help improve our understanding of policy reactions in the face of 
different and large shocks. Global financial crises in recent years and their implications for 
macroeconomic stability call for prudent policy reactions by policymakers in response to shocks 
from different sources (such as energy and commodity price shocks versus financial shocks). In 
future research, it will be important to examine how a policy rule could be applied responsibly to 
structural shocks including large financial shocks. It will also be interesting to extend the new 
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